Russia: A matter of perspective

As most of you are probably aware, over time I have gone from being a big Russia enthusiast to someone who appreciates lots of things about the place (its music, its books, its films, many of its people, its vastness, its vodka, etc) but finds much of it exasperating, particularly where relations with its neighbours are concerned. This change of attitude is not really surprising, given that I’ve spent a fair part of the last three years in Georgia and Ukraine, two countries which have witnessed ‘revolutions’ the Kremlin didn’t want and have consequently got on rather badly with their northern neighbour. Add being married to a (rather patriotic) Ukrainian into the mix, and it can be a little hard, shall we say, to maintain any sense of objectivity…

For this reason, I’m always glad to have the opportunity to go back to Russia, to make at least some attempt to see things from a different angle. My trip to Vladivostok was good in that respect, and did produce a subtle shift in my thinking – but not much of one…

Every time I go back to Russia now, I am struck by how much it has changed since the Yeltsin years. And to be honest, in many ways for the better. The sense of chaos that reverberated around Russia in the 1990s has largely gone, and it is notably richer and more stable. For most people, that’s enough. If you’d been through a rapid drop in your living standards, a collapse of the old social institutions with little to replace them, and a sudden criminalisation of large swathes of the economy…well, you’d probably be happy just to be making money and feeling a little safer on the streets. The fact that there’s little to cheer and lots to worry about in other areas of life of concern to us Westerners, such as freedom of speech, the rule of law, and Russia’s foreign policy (particularly energy), doesn’t mean jack to the majority of Russians.

In economic and business terms, Russia feels fairly liberal these days. Sure, most of the institutions of state are now run by people with strong links to the security services. But for the moment at least, it’s not quite so concerning as it sounds, since the main ideology uniting the elite seems to be little more than a desire to make as much money as possible. So providing you keep your head down, pay the right people (not necessarily the taxman), and don’t meddle in politics, you’re increasingly free to get on with running your business. Now Russia has vast oil wealth, signs of greater prosperity are obvious, from major infrastructure projects through to better cars.

To slightly contradict what I’ve just said, however, though the ruling elite doesn’t appear to have much of a unifying ideology beyond making money, it does increasingly exhibit some of the characteristics you would expect from a bunch of old KGB hands: suspicion of the West; a tendency towards secrecy; an assumption that many things can best be dealt with in devious and underhand ways, or by force; and a near total lack of understanding (or support) of democratic processes of governance.

These tendencies are on full display if you watch Russian TV, particularly news and documentary programmes. I had the pleasure of watching an extremely biased piece on Transdnistria just before I left, which left you in no doubt who are the bad guys (Moldovans, Ukrainians) and who are the good guys (Russian ‘peacekeepers’, all Transdnistrians). Not that anyone interviewed any Moldovans or Ukrainians to give them a chance to present their interpretations of events, of course…

What I still find slightly confusing, or at least saddening, is that I’m sure most Russians know that the standard of journalism and objectivity on their televisions leaves something to be desired, yet still seem to believe that what they are told represents the full picture. This struck me particularly whenever the conversation turned to Ukraine. I realised quite quickly that there was no point in even trying to share my impressions of what was happening in the country, as no one was listening. Never mind the fact that I have been living in Ukraine for several months, and following events here for several years. Clearly, I knew nothing about Ukraine and they were all experts, even in Vladivostok – which is only about 10,000 km away.

Apparently, Ukraine is now a NATO puppet state, Russian speakers are suffering intolerable oppression from the Western Ukrainian junta which controls the country following an illegal coup d’état, Crimea is already on the verge of civil war and the whole of Ukraine is likely to fall into deeper and deeper political confrontation, which could tear the place apart. At first I tried to explain that while there might be a grain of truth in at least some of these statements, this picture is somewhat far from reality, but I soon gave up.

It’s all rather sad. Much as I love them, Ukraine and Georgia are two weak, vulnerable states whose people, on balance, are generally worse off than the Russians. Getting them back into a Russian sphere of influence would not really be that hard, if Russia had any idea how to talk to them appropriately. But the only way the Kremlin can think of acting towards countries it views as ‘disloyal’ is to keep bashing them. I guess the theory is that eventually the anti-Kremlin government will collapse and pro-Russian politicians can snatch power. But it’s obvious that all it is achieving is creating weaker states on Russia’s periphery that can’t stand Moscow. Clever.

Of course, Russia is far from the only country where distorting the facts and believing it yourself is a problem (ain’t that right, you neocons?), and Russian accusations of double standards (which they always make about everything) do carry some weight. But in the end, the fact that most people seem to swallow the very one-sided view of things presented in the Russian media is a problem for Russia itself: on many issues, a gap is gradually opening up between how things are perceived and what is really going on. This will limit the ability of its rulers to make effective policy decisions that address the real issues, and when things go wrong, it will undermine the legitimacy of a government who has presented the facts in a misleading light.

One school of thought has it that ‘softly’ authoritarian governments often allow for rapid economic development, and that after reaching a certain critical mass things other than money gradually become more important. At this point, the country makes a managed transition towards a more democratic system. The end result is a country that is healthy both economically and politically. Quite a few people think Putin’s Russia might go this way.

Others are not so sure, and think that the same ‘softly’ authoritarian governments often actually end up restricting economic growth, certainly restrict democratic development, and end up collapsing with everyone back to square one, or in an even worse state. This is another scenario for Russia, which might be triggered by a political crisis in 2008 after Putin has run his two terms, a drop in oil and gas prices, or any other number of other unpleasant events.

Being a pessimist and Russia-wary, I’ve often tended towards the latter view. But as usual, the more I think about it, the less sure I am. But whatever happens, don’t expect a more constructive policy towards Ukraine any time soon…